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Political Science and the Intellectuals
Eric Voegelin

Paper presented at the 48th Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association,
26-28 August 1952.

1. Introductory notes

This paper, written in the same year as the publication of The New Science of Politics, should be of interest to students of Voegelin's thought as a brief and clear statement of his diagnosis of the immanentist character of contemporary "intellectual life", and its relationship to the outlook of ancient gnosticism.

For further study:

* Voegelin's diagnosis of the sources and outlook of such immanentist perspectives in the modern world, may be usefully compared with the discussion of "gnostic systems of identity" in the work of Max Scheler. See:

Max Scheler *On the Eternal in Man*, London: SCM Press, 1960, pp. 130-134; 178-179; original text in *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 5. Zuerich und Muenchen: Francke Verlag, 1954.

* For Voegelin's detailed examination of the work of Arnold Toynbee (p. 10), see:

Israel and Revelation; *The World of the Polis*; *The Ecumenic Age*. *Order and History*, vols. 1, 2, 4. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, pages as indexed;

"Toynbee's History as a Search for Truth." In *The Intent of Toynbee's History*. Edited by Edward T. Gargan, pp. 183-98. Chicago, Illinois: Loyola University Press, 1961.

"Les perspectives d'avenir de la civilisation occidentale." In *L'Histoire et ses interpretations. Entretiens autour de Arnold Toynbee*. Edited by Raymond Aron, pp. 133-51. The Hague: Mouton, 1961. [Transcript of dialogue. Cerisy-la-Salle, 1958].

* For the significance of the brief reference on p. 16 of this paper to "the contemporary democratic creed (Lindsay)", see the discussion by Voegelin of A.D. Lindsay's *The Modern Democratic State* in:

"The Oxford Political Philosophers", *Philosophical Quarterly* 3 (1953):97-114, at 108-110.

* To examine further Voegelin's estimate of More's *Utopia*, to which this paper refers on p. 19, see:

"The Order of Reason: Erasmus and More." In *Renaissance and Reformation* edited by David L. Morse and William M. Thompson. *History of Political Ideas* vol. 4. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1998, pp. 88-130;

"Die Spielerische Grausamkeit der Humanisten." Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Morus. Aus dem Englischen und mit ein Vorwort von Dietmar Herz. Muenchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag,

1995.

"More's Utopia." *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift fuer Oeffentliches Recht*_ N.F. 3 (1951) 451-68;

* The diagnosis of the dream-world in the Utopia of More, and of progressivism in D'Alembert, given in this paper (p. 19) , can be found in a slightly shortened form in *The New Science of Politics*_. See:

*The New Science of Politics: An Introduction*_ Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 121; translation *Die Neue Wissenschaft der Politik: Eine Einfuehrung*_. Muenchen: Karl Alber, 1991, S. 177.

* For the issue of the sophist-intellectuals as "sleepwalkers", taking their dreams for reality, confined to their own worlds of passion and imagination (p. 20), see:

*Anamnesis*_, partial translation by Gerhart Niemeyer. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1990, pp. 80, 98; *Anamnesis: Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik*_. Muenchen: R. Piper Verlag, 1966, S. 143; *The World of the Polis*_. *Order and History*_ vol. 2. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957, pp. 233, 241; *Plato and Aristotle*_. *Order and History*_ vol. 3. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957, p. 107. See also Hermann Broch *The Sleepwalkers: A Trilogy*_. New York: Random House, 1996; *Die Schlafwaendler: Eine Trilogie*_. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982.

* For an extended treatment of the prospects for the re-establishment of rational communication in the contemporary situation - the issue with which this paper concludes on p. 21 - see:

"Necessary Moral Bases for Communication in a Democracy." In *Problems of Communication in a Pluralistic Society*_. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1956, pp. 53-68

Page numbers in the original are given in square brackets: [].

Geoffrey Price

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2. _Text of paper_

[1] _Political Science and the Intellectuals_

When for this occasion we have chosen the relation between political science and the intellectuals as the subject of our discussion, we have returned to the oldest topic of our science. It is the oldest topic because it is the oldest pragmatic issue. The political science that was created by Plato and Aristotle was established in opposition to the opinions held by the intellectuals of their time, by the sophists. And the conflict with the intellectuals, the revolt against the intellectuals, from which emerged our science, is monumentally commemorated to this day in the political dialogues of Plato's early and middle years. From its origins the science of politics is a militant enterprise, a defense of truth both political and practical. It is a defense of true knowledge about human existence in society against the untrue opinions dispensed by intellectuals: and it is a defense of true human being against the corruption of man perpetrated by the intellectuals.

That much is clear. As soon as we get beyond this point, however, when we try to act as militant scientists in the Platonic sense in our time, we encounter difficulties -- difficulties of a semantic nature. The semantic conventions have moved a considerable distance from the Platonic situation. When Plato created his science, his _episteme_, he meant by this word the knowledge of the essence of things; and the man who [2] was capable to penetrate the essence of things, was the philosopher. Philosophical and scientific knowledge were synonymous. Today, under the influence of the natural sciences, we conventionally distinguish between science and philosophy; a political scientist is not in the habit of thinking of himself as a political philosopher; the theory of politics is set aside, not to say brushed aside, as something a political scientist can do without. The reasons for the distinction will occupy us a bit later on. For the moment we must be aware that our conventions make the distinction. And it will be a first step towards our subject to break with the convention, to accept the Platonic notion of science as a search for truth concerning the essential in matters of politics, to conceive again of science as a philosopher's knowledge about things.

The second semantic difficulty arises from our lack of adequate concepts for designating the position of the intellectual. Plato, in his situation of conflict, has developed parallel terminologies for the philosophical and sophistic attitudes. But most of his terms for the sophistic side have fallen into desuetude. Even his primary pair of terms -- _philosopher - sophist_ -- is today only used by professional philosophers. We are not in the habit of referring to the intellectual confusion of the age as a sophistic confusion; we use the term "intellectual" instead of sophist, and intellectual has not the precise meaning which Plato gave to this term. Plato, furthermore, created the pair _episteme-doxa_ in order to distinguish between the philosopher's and the sophist's knowledge; but again, our [3] equivalent for _doxa_, opinion, does not have the Platonic precision. And finally he created the pair _philosophos - philodoxos_, the lover of wisdom and the lover of opinion, in order to distinguish between the two types. But only the philosopher has survived -- though certainly we have no lack of philodoxers. The intellectual confusion has even reached the point of inverting the meaning of the terms science and doxa. Perhaps fortunately the field of sophistries has become so rich, that the various sophists expose one another; one ideologist points his finger to the next and calls him an ideologist. We are in the situation which Karl Mannheim has characterised as the "general suspicion of ideology". And this suspicion has, indeed, become so general that our sophists treat the classical philosophers as ideologists and "expose" them, while presumably claiming for themselves the dignity of scientists. We have books today which treat Plato and Aristotle as a sort of Fascist intellectuals, while the liberal sophists who write them off cast themselves in the role of philosophers. As you see, we are right in the middle of the subject, not to say of the brawl. And you will discern, at least in outline, one of the reasons for the contemporary convention of distinguishing between political science and political philosophy. The reason is that a good deal of what conventionally we call political science is not science at all but sophistic opining; when our sophists draw the line, as they love to do, between their science and philosophy, they are well justified, though not in the sense which they intend; for what they produce is really not philosophy -- but by [4] the same token neither is it science.

From semantic preliminaries let us now turn to the conflict itself. Again Plato will be our guide. But the limits of a paper will compel rigid selection from his ideas. I shall begin with his distinction between the philosopher as a man who lives in contact with reality, and the sophist as a man who has lost his grip on reality and lives in a

dream-world of his own making. The distinction goes substantially back to Heraclitus and Xenophanes. The philosopher is the man who lives in partnership with what is common to all men, that is, with the divine nous or reason that transcends them all. Through participation in what is common men become a community; and since the transcendent nous is the universally common, men through participation in it become members of universal mankind. With regard to the universal common, before God, all men are equal; through participation in the common, man gains the essence of his humanity; he realizes himself as a finite being capable of transcendence. He discovers that through the experience of transcendence, through the opening of his soul toward divine reality, he has entered what Henri Bergson has called the "open society". The philosopher who orders his own life, as well as his relations to his fellow-men, by this experience of the common, is in fact every man who has achieved full actualization of his manhood. A political science which bases itself on this conception of man, thus, becomes a science of the true order of human existence in society.

Against this fully developed manhood, the manhood of the philosopher, literally: of the lover of wisdom, stands the [5] sophist. He is the man who does not want to live in harmony with transcendent reality. He opposes his defiant "Man is the Measure" to the Platonic "God is the Measure". The order, in which after all he also must live after a fashion, must be nourished from the resources of empirical, immanent man, without recourse to transcendental orientation. This creation of immanent worlds out of the passions and desires of empirical man is the creation of dream-worlds. Heraclitus speaks of such private dreamers as the sleep-walkers; and the term has remained in use to the time of Marcus Aurelius.

Let me give you a modern example of what such dreaming means. Condorcet, in the eighteenth century, conceived the idea of progressive immortality for man. He knew from statistics that the life expectancy of man was going up; and he asked himself, why shouldn't it go up indefinitely? He combined the idea with the assumption, considered scientifically established at the time, that acquired characteristics could become hereditary features. The men with their higher life expectancy would transmit this quality to their children; they in their turn could build still higher on what they had inherited; and something like practical immortality was on the cards for mankind. Here you see intellectual dreaming in the raw. There is a solid basis in so-called science, even in statistics; and what could be more respectable, than actuarial tables of life-insurance companies; accepting that empirical observation, Condorcet extrapolates it quite consistently into the future. We know

that the speculation is ridiculous; but we know it only because we know about [6] our human finiteness through experience of transcendence. If we do not accept the reality of the rhythm of life and death; if we do not experience death, as Socrates and Plato so strongly did, as an essential ordering, cathartic forces within our lives; if we do not experience that without death life makes no sense; then the speculation of Condorcet is not ridiculous at all. And that is what makes this type of dreaming so dangerous. On the assumptions of the dreamer, we have no argument against him. If essential sectors of reality are declared to be non-existent, the dreamer is free to develop, with rigid logic[al] consistency, the most atrocious nonsense on the basis of his fragmentary reality.

Moreover, this sort of nonsense that we see in the case of Condorcet is not a curiosity without practical importance. In one form or another, on various levels of consciousness, this particular dream is rather pervasive in our society. You may remember Aldous Huxley's amusing novel *After Many a Summer Dies the Swan*. It could become a best-seller because Huxley was hitting at a state of mind that his readers immediately recognized from numerous personal experiences in their environment -- and perhaps in themselves. And as far as the heredity of acquired characteristics is concerned, I have only to remind you of the Lysenko affair.

A further instance of sophistic dreaming, given by Plato himself, is the conception of order in terms of agreement or contract. Here again the reality of common order that constitutes fellowship among men is denied. The sophist is unable to [7] see that agreement, contract or promise concerning anything concretely is impossible, unless the meaning of agreement is understood. The common bond between men must exist in reality, and be experienced as existing, in order to make mutual declarations concerning future conduct intelligible as agreements with binding force. The binding force of specific agreement derives from the ontologically pre-existence common bond; one cannot derive the common bond from agreement. From his analysis, Plato draw the conclusion that a "theory" which lets order originate in agreement, is not a "theory" since it misses the essence of the bond of order; it is a doxa, an opinion. It is the typical doxa of the immanentist intellectual who, since he has no experience of the transcendental sources of order, must let the phenomenon of order originate in actions of individuals who want to avoid the disadvantages of disorder.

I consider the Platonic analysis and conclusion valid, and shall

therefore draw the following further conclusions: There is not such thing as a contract-theory of government. What goes under the name is a sophistic doxa concerning the origin and meaning of order. There is, furthermore, no history of a contract-theory, ranging from the sophists of antiquity to the modern intellectuals. There only recurs in our sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a situation of civilizational crisis which produces phenomena comparable to those of the Greek fifth and fourth centuries. The culture of common humanity breaks down; and the order of the community is torn by formidable wars of the sleepwalkers who want to substitute their private dream [8] worlds for the common public world. In this Hobbesian war of all against all, when the common source of substantive order in transcendent reality is lost, a sort of negative order must be established as a mutual agreement to hold one's peace under governmental sanction. When the *_summum bonum_* is denied its ordering function in the soul of men and of society, when its very existence is denied -- as it was denied by Hobbes --, then the *_summum malum_*, the fear of physical death[,] becomes the force that imposes peace. We can generalize the insight gained by Plato in his situation and say: that the appearance of the contract-doxa is the symptom of civilizational crisis.

Equipped with this knowledge, we can form a clearer view of the problems presented by the intellectuals. Intellectuals are immanentists. To be an immanentist means to have suffered the loss of an important segment of reality, of the experiences of transcendence, and consequently to be unable to order one's own personality through orientation to transcendent reality, as well as to cooperate with fellow human beings in establishing a social order which expresses the common humanity. In his spiritually crippled condition the intellectual can only produce an order which expresses the limited empirical content of his passions and desires, of his aspirations and personal value dreams. This does not mean that the intellectual cannot gain adherents; his fellowship, indeed, may be large, as for instance the Marxist followership. But however large it may become it cannot achieve essential humanity through multiplication of cripples; a large followership only means that a great number [9] of human beings have followed the intellectual into the prison of his dreams. This is the practical aspect of the problem. -- As far as the theoretical aspect is concerned, we can now see why a great deal of what is conventionally called political science does not qualify as science in the strict, philosophical sense. Most of what we indiscriminately call political ideas, of which I have given the so-called contract theory as an instance, are *_doxai_* expressing the dream position of this or that immanentist intellectual. They do not approach the subject

of science, that is, the essence of social phenomena. Since however we live in a predominantly sophistic civilization the doxic symbolism has penetrated our language, and especially our language of political discourse. And the area of science in this _melee_ of doxic debate has become exceedingly small.

The relation of science to sophistic pseudo-science also had worried Plato. Again he resumes ideas that had been suggested already by Heraclitus. Both identify the sophists with the development of polyhistory (in Greek: polymathie). The matter deserves a moment's attention because in this point as in others, the intellectuals of our time have managed to turn the tables by accusing the scientists of polyhistory, while claiming true pursuit of science for their own polyhistoric efforts. By polyhistory both Heraclitus and Plato means the accumulation of variegated knowledge without reference to essence. They stigmatized the unrestrained accumulation of factual knowledge without theoretical penetration as a hindrance to science rather than an advance. In our contemporary situation the issue has been obscured by the farflung ramification [10] of science which permits the individual scholar to specialise only on a comparatively limited sector. This situation, which in itself is inevitable and beyond criticism, is put to good use by the intellectuals for the purpose of preventing science. Take the case of Toynbee's _Study of History_, one of the great attempts to submit the phenomenon of history, and especially of political history, to theoretical exploration. As far as our political scientists and philosophers do not simply ignore the work, as mostly they do, they are rather inclined to criticize it as a polyhistoric attempt that did not succeed too well because in our age of specialization one man cannot know everything. Such critics fail to see that Toynbee's work is not a one-man _Cambridge History_ but a theoretical work which tries to bring out the essence of the historical processes, using the materials at the level of digestion available in the most recent standard treatises by specializing authorities in the various historical fields - which inevitably entails the absorption of all errors of fact and judgement at the level of the specialist literature used. But I suspect that the critics do not fail to see the point; they rather do not want to see it because what they really do not like is the theory itself. Toynbee is a classical scholar and a conscious Christian, and his strongest modern influence stems from Bergson's _Deux Sources_. Toynbee, whatever the shortcomings [11] of his theory may be, is really a theorist in the Platonic sense. And his establishment of standards of relevance casts a light on the irrelevance of a good deal of specialized work; and that light is experienced as uncomfortable by the critics. For under the

cover of specializing respectability there has grown like a cancer in our academic world the methodical accumulation of irrelevant facts -- which apparently even its authors are ashamed to call science, for they prefer to call it research. Polyhistory is with us today as it was present in the time of Plato. But today it takes cover under specialization which on the surface seems to be the opposite of polyhistory. I shall, therefore, take the liberty of redefining specialization as polyhistory aggravated by division of labour. Understood in this sense, specialization, unless severely disciplined by the solid theoretical training of the specialist, has become one of the most serious obstacles to the advancement of science in our field.

Up to this point I have tried to elucidate the relation between political science and the intellectuals by means of the critical instruments placed at our disposition by Plato. These instruments, as you have seen, carry a long way; but they will not carry all the way. One can classify the modern intellectual as a variant of the sophistic type, but the classification does not exhaust his nature. There is an ingredient in the modern intellectual that was not, and could not be, present in the sophist; for the Hellenic civilization of Plato's time had not yet experienced the impact of Near Eastern religiousness, of [12] Christianity and Gnosis. With the expansion and consolidation of the Roman Empire, the religions of the East moved westward, and especially the complex of Christianity and Gnosis began to form the spiritual environment in which Western thought in the more restricted sense developed.

Christianity and Gnosis must be treated as one complex of religions. Gnostic elements are strongly present in the writings of the New Testament, in the Letters of St. Paul, in the Gospel of St. John, and especially in Revelation. The intellectual history of Christianity in the early centuries is to a large extent the struggle for clarifying the meaning of Christianity proper and to eliminate the Gnostic elements from Christian doctrine. This struggle is substantially concluded, with success, in the work of St. Augustine. As a result we have a division of religions which both can base themselves on parts of the New Testament writings. It is the division which either can be described as orthodoxy and heresy, or as the Christianity of the Church and sectarian Christianity, or as apocalyptic and eschatological Christianity, or -- as I prefer to call the difference -- as Christianity and Gnosis.

The issue relevant for our present purpose is the division concerning the state of perfection. Orthodox Christianity has decided that Christ is present, through the Spirit, in the Church right here and now in

history. That is the so-called apocalyptic attitude. The Spirit is revealed in history through the Church. The state of perfection is transcendent, following the end of history, with its eschatological events of the [13] appearance of the Antichrist, the Parousia, and the last Judgement. The Gnostic branch assumes that the Church is transitory in history, and that a state of perfection will be achieved in history through the coming of Christ according to Revelation. That is the so-called eschatological attitude, which expects a millennium on earth. The terrestrial paradise, furthermore, can be advanced through human action. The new carriers of the New Realm are the saints of the Lord, who can be recognized as such even now. They are the elect, who therefore should separate from the transitory and at least partially corrupt Church, and prepare themselves in special communities for the coming of the millennium, and - in radical forms of the creed -- even take a hand in bringing it about -- though Revelation 20 has preserved the bringing about to an angel of the Lord. Both branches of religiousness, as you can see, can draw on texts of the New Testament, and are therefore able to vituperate each other as the corrupters of the true message -- which they have lustily done, and are still doing.

Let us now relate the division of religiousness to the Platonic division of philosopher and sophist. This requires a rough simplification of a complex matter -- but it will have to do for the present. The philosophers, we may say, as far as they have absorbed the religiousness of the New Testament, have become Gnostic intellectuals. The fundamental distinction between the two types, however, has remained, under the new [14] dispensation, the same as developed by Plato: the philosopher is still the transcendentalist, the intellectual the immanentist.

The typical content of the modern intellectual doxa can be ascertained comparatively easily. For the principal doxic symbols which have come to dominate the so-called modern period were systematically developed by Joachim of Flora in the last decade of the twelfth century. Joachim broke with the Augustinian orthodox conception of a Christian society; and applied to his new philosophy of history the symbol of the Trinity. In his speculation the history of mankind had three periods, corresponding to the three persons of the Trinity. The first period of the world was the age of the Father; with the appearance of Christ began the age of the Son; but the age of the Son will not be the last one; it will be followed by a third age of the Spirit. The three ages were characterized as intelligible increases of spiritual fulfilment. The first age unfolded the life of the layman; the second age brought the active-contemplative life of the priest; the third age would bring the

perfect spiritual life of the monk. Moreover, the ages had comparable internal structures and a calculable length. From the comparison of structures it appeared that each age opened with a trinity of leading figures, that is, with two precursors, followed by the leader of the age himself; and from the calculation of length it followed that the age of the Son would reach its end in 1260. The leader of the first age was Abraham; the leader of the second age was Christ; and Joachim predicted that by 1260 there would appear the *_Dux e Babylone_*, the leader of the third age.

[15] In his trinitarian eschatology Joachim created the aggregate of symbols which govern the intellectualist interpretation of politics and history to this day.

The first of these symbols is the conception of history as a sequence of three ages, of which the third age is intelligibly the final Third Realm. As variations of this symbol are recognizable the humanistic and encyclopaedist periodization of history into ancient, mediaeval, and modern history; Turgot's and Comte's theory of a sequence of theological, metaphysical, and scientific phases; Hegel's dialectic of the three stages of freedom and self-reflective spiritual fulfilment; the Marxian dialectic of the three stages of primitive communism, class society, and final communism; and finally the National Socialist symbol of the Third Realm.

The second symbol is that of the leader. It had its immediate effectiveness in the movement of the Franciscan spirituals who saw in St. Francis the fulfilment of Joachim's prophecy; and its effectiveness was reinforced by Dante's speculation on the Dux of the new spiritual age. It then can be traced in the paracletic figures, the *_homines spirituales_*, and *_homines novi_*, of the late Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and Reformation; it can be discerned as a component in Machiavelli's *_principe_*; and in the period of secularization it appears in the superman ideas of Condorcet, Comte and Marx; until it dominates the contemporary scene through the paracletic leaders of the new realms.

[16] The third symbol, sometimes blending into the second, is that of the prophet of the new age. In order to lend validity and conviction to the idea of a final Third Realm, the course of history as an intelligible, meaningful whole must be assumed accessible to human knowledge, either through a direct revelation or through speculative gnosis. Hence, the Gnostic prophet, or, in the later stages of secularization, the Gnostic intellectual, becomes an appurtenance of modern civilization.

Joachim himself is the first instance of the species.

The fourth symbol is that of the brotherhood of autonomous persons. The third age of Joachim, by virtue of its new descent of the spirit, will transform men into members of the new realm without sacramental mediation of Grace. In the third age the church will cease to exist because the charismatic gifts that are necessary for the perfect life will reach men without administration of sacraments. While Joachim himself conceived the new age concretely as an order of monks, the idea of a community of the spiritually perfect who can live without institutional authority was formulated on principle. The idea was capable of infinite variations. It can be traced in various degrees of purity in medieval and Renaissance sects, as well as in the Puritan churches of the saints; in its secularized form it has become a formidable component in the contemporary democratic creed (Lindsay); and it is the dynamic core in the Marxian mysticism of the realm of freedom and the withering-away of the state.

The four symbols just described determine the general structure of the modern intellectual doxa. Before engaging in [17] a little further differentiation, we must, however, consider what is wrong with the Joachitic construction on principle. Why do we classify this aggregate of symbols as doxic in opposition to theoretical or philosophical; why as Gnostic in opposition to Christian? The reason is that Joachim has immanentized the idea of transcendent perfection. From the Joachitic immanentization a theoretical problem arises which does occur neither in classical antiquity nor in orthodox Christianity, that it, the problem of an essence, or *eidos*, of a meaning of history. In Hellenic speculation, to be sure, we also have a problem of essence in politics; the polis has an essence, or *eidos*, for both Plato and Aristotle. But the actualization of this essence is governed by the rhythm of growth and decay; and the rhythmical embodiment and disembodiment of essence in political reality is the mystery of existence; it is not an additional essence. The soteriological truth of Christianity, then, breaks with the rhythm of existence; beyond temporal processes and reverses lies the supernatural destiny of man, the perfection through grace in the beyond, the beatific vision in death. Man and mankind now have a fulfilment, but it lies beyond nature, beyond immanent experience. Again there is no meaning of history, because the eschatological supernature is not a nature in the philosophical sense. The problem of an *eidos*, of a meaning in history, hence arises only when the Christian idea of transcendental fulfilment becomes immanentized. Such an immanentist hypostasis of the eschaton, however, is a theoretical fallacy. Things are not things, nor do they

have [18] essences, by arbitrary declaration. The course of history as a whole is no object of experience; history has no *eidos*, because the meaning of history extends into the unknown future. The meaning of history, thus, is an illusion; and this illusionary *eidos* is created by treating the symbol of faith as if it were a proposition concerning an object of immanent experience.

The Gnostic intellectual, thus, like the sophist of antiquity, denies the existence of a transcendent order of being; and replaces the transcendent order by an order of his own making. And in particular, he draws the Christian transcendent perfection into his reach, and tries to do God's work by himself, by creating the perfect order in history. The perfection through divine grace in the beyond becomes perfection through the activity of the intellectual.

This peculiar result of the intellectual's *doxa* will become even clearer, when now we examine the process of immanentization in some of its details. The Christian symbolism of supernatural perfection has in itself a theoretical structure, and this structure is reproduced in the variants of Gnostic immanentization. The pilgrim's progress, the sanctification of life, is a movement towards a *telos*, towards a goal; and this goal, the beatific vision, is the state of perfection. Hence, in the Christian symbolism, one can distinguish the movement toward the goal as its teleological component, from the state of highest value as the axiological component. -- The two components reappear in the variants of immanentization; and they [19] can accordingly be classified as variants which either accentuate the teleological or the axiological component, or combine them both in their symbolism.

In the first case, when the accent lies strongly on the movement, without clarity about the final state of perfection, the result will be a progressivist interpretation of history. The aim need not be clarified, because progressivist thinkers, men like Diderot or D'Alembert, select what they consider desirable factors from their immediate environment; and erect the selection into a standard. Progress then will be a qualitative and quantitative increase of what is considered presently as good -- the "bigger and better" of our simplifying slogan. Progressivism in this sense, odd as it may sound, is essentially a conservative attitude because it is based on a historical situation which soon will be superseded; and it easily may become a reactionary attitude unless the original standard is adjusted to the changing historical situation. If you remember the manner in which our old liberals are branded as reactionaries by our new liberals, you will see the catch in progressivism.

In the second case, when the accent lies strongly on the state of perfection, without clarity about the means that are required for its realization, the result will be utopianism. It may assume the form of an axiological dream-world, as in the Utopia of More, where the thinker is still aware that the dream is unrealizable. Or, with increasing theoretical illiteracy, it may assume the form of various social idealisms, such as the war to end wars, the abolition of unequal distribution of property, the freedom from want and fear, and so forth. [20]

And, finally, immanentization may extend to the complete Christian symbol. The result will then be an activist mysticism of perfection, to be achieved through a revolutionary transfiguration of the nature of man. Such as mysticism of the "new man", through participation in violent revolutionary upheavals, we find, for instance, in Marxism.


Our survey of the main symbols and principal variants of modern, Gnostic intellectualism, has served two purposes; it has elucidated both the theoretical and practical problem which confronts the political scientist in our time. The theoretical problem is relatively simple. We know what an intellectual is: He is a sleepwalker, cooped up in the dream-world of his Gnostic fallacies. And we have a fairly good knowledge of [sc. the] nature and content of the dreams. There is a voluminous, and still strongly growing, literature in existence, which deals with the various historical and systematic aspects of Gnostic dreaming. Nobody who claims to be a political scientist has today an excuse not to know what the theoretical problem is.

The practical problem is quite a different matter. From the survey it is obvious that our political environment, on the world scale, is dominated by Gnostic ideologies. Most of what we call political literature is exposition or apology of this or that Gnostic dream, or an attack on it. Political science in the strict sense leads a precarious existence in this sea of Gnosticism. And there is no hope that the situation will change [21] substantially in any visible future. The only symptom that the days of the Gnostic nightmare are numbered is the existence of the literature to which I referred. This literature did not exist at the turn of the century. It has grown during the last fifty, and most intensely during the last thirty years. We can speak today of a revival of political science; and the clear understanding of the nature of intellectualism, as a first condition of the revival, is achieved. Beyond this point nobody can venture a prediction.

In conclusion let me refer to the topic that appears in the title of our Panel: Communication between American and European Intellectuals. This certainly is a sore practical issue. But I take it, you will have gathered from this paper, that it is rather incidental to the main topic treated here. Communication is difficult, if not impossible, between any types of intellectuals -- whether American or European, or French and German, or Liberals and Fascists -- because the interruption of communication, and the closing up in a dream world, is the essence of intellectualism. The various types of intellectuals are prone to hate each other quite as much as they hate the philosophers. They all are inclined to see the world as a conspiracy against their private dream. In illustration of this point I like to confront two characteristic utterances of intellectuals in power. During the war Goebbels in one of his speeches spoke of the three great Communist conspirators against the glory of National Socialism; the three Communist conspirators were Roosevelt, Stalin and the Pope. [22] After the war, Stalin in one of his speeches referred to three great Fascist conspirators against the glory of Communism; the three Fascist conspirators were Truman, Attlee and the Pope.

Such pathological idiocy, which is the consequence of self-imprisonment in a dream-world, leaves not much hope for the establishment of rational communication.

Is there no solution to this practical impasse of communication at all? Of course, there is one; and it should be obvious. The solution is that the intellectuals stop being intellectuals; that the sleepwalkers awake from their dream and re-enter the community of mankind. But it is doubtful whether this solution has much chance to be realized. For, to awake from the dream requires more than brains -- of which the intellectuals have quite enough. It requires the spiritual stamina to face reality; it requires faith and trust in transcendent reality, the *pistis* in the Pauline sense. And faith and trust, the spiritual guts -- that is what the intellectuals don't have.



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